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Who is the modern ‘traitor’? 
‘Fifth column’ accusations in  
US and UK politics and media
Dmitry Chernobrov
The University of Sheffield, UK
Abstract
Accusations of treason and disloyalty have been increasingly visible in both western and 
international politics in recent years, from Russia and Turkey, to Brexit and the 2016 US 
presidential election. This article explores ‘traitor’ accusations in modern politics, with evidence 
from British and American newspapers for 2011–2016. Besides British and American politics, 
results reveal reported ‘fifth column’ accusations in over 40 countries. I identify three dominant 
patterns: authoritarian states describing opposition movements as a ‘fifth column’; suspicion of 
western Muslim populations as potential terrorists; and the use of traitor language to denote party 
dissent in western politics. Employed across the political spectrum, and not only by right-wing or 
populist movements, accusations of treason and betrayal point at a deeper breakdown of social 
trust and communicate collective securitizing responses to perceived threats.
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Introduction
Brexit and the election of Donald Trump have sparked widespread debates on post-truth 
politics, conspiracies, fake news, and propaganda. Both events and the debates preceding 
them have revealed political mistrust, deep tensions, and suspicions that split societies 
into ‘Brexiteers’ and ‘Remainers’, Trump supporters and opponents, locals and migrants. 
These tensions involved accusations of disloyalty and betrayal, intertwining these cam-
paigns with other events and security threats: the rise of the Islamic State, the refugee 
crisis, speculations of a ‘new cold war’, and suspicions of foreign interference. The rise 
in threat narratives and accusations of betrayal, which help isolate these threats to 
particular objects, can signal growing anti-migrant sentiments, the rise of populist move-
ments, and mistrust in democracy.
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This article brings together recent ‘traitor’ accusations to evaluate how the political 
language of betrayal and infiltration by ‘fifth columns’ has been called on to prohibit, 
exclude, and defile a variety of societal objects and groups. The term ‘fifth column’ origi-
nated in the Spanish Civil war, when nationalist General Mola announced that although 
four columns of troops surrounded Madrid, the city would fall to a fifth column ready to 
strike from within (Thurlow, 1999). The Spanish government responded with a search 
and arrest operation in the city looking for traitors (Loeffel, 2015: 9). The label became 
widely used with the hunt for ‘Nazi sympathizers’ in the 1940s and communist agents in 
1950s. Since then, it has meant an internal enemy, an insider with questionable loyalty 
and identity, such as a traitor or a spy. Yet, it is not simply the language from the past, 
although most ‘fifth column’ studies confine it to the 1940s–1950s period (Loeffel, 2015; 
MacDonnell, 1995; Prysor, 2005; Saunders and Taylor, 1988; Thurlow, 1999). More 
recent notable ‘fifth columnists’ included Tutsi women as seducers ‘in cahoots with Hutu 
enemies’ in Hutu propaganda in Rwanda (Hudson, 2014: 109), ‘new Danes’ as potential 
security threats (Agius, 2013), and mainstream political elites accused of betraying the 
nation by right-wing parties in Denmark (see Agius, 2017).
The traitor accusations of today draw heavily on the easily recognizable ‘fifth column’ 
label, but the speakers and objects of the accusation are new. This article employs news-
paper content and discourse analysis to explore the contemporary contours of traitor nar-
ratives in the United Kingdom and the United States in 2011–2016, including the speakers 
and objects of the ‘fifth column’ accusations, their dynamics, connections to particular 
events, and political significance. As an extreme expression of expulsion, traitor narra-
tives point to the most acute political and societal insecurities.
The article puts forward three arguments. First, I demonstrate that even before Brexit 
and the election of Donald Trump, British and American media reported traitor accusa-
tions in both domestic and international politics. Threat narratives and ‘fifth column’ 
accusations have found new applications in western politics, including dissent within 
major political parties and fear of Muslims as terrorists. Second, accusations of betrayal 
offer suitable targets to blame to populist movements and anti-migrant campaigns. Yet, I 
also show that the current ‘fifth column’ language is not confined to right-wing or popu-
list movements as may have been expected; it is found across the political spectrum and 
in over 40 countries. Third, the article offers a theoretical argument on how traitor accusa-
tions help draw in- and out-group boundaries, create uneven power relations, attach 
threats to particular objects and thus build the feelings of certainty and security.
‘Fifth column’, identity and security
The widespread and similar use of the ‘fifth column’ label in 1940–1950s, both in the 
United States and the United Kingdom, created a recognizable cultural symbol that car-
ries particular associations. Over the years, it has included a variety of individuals, groups, 
and objects to suit different political agendas. As such, its exact boundary is not easy to 
define. It has widely been associated with the conflicting loyalties of foreign nationals as 
‘their country of residence is seen to be in conflict with their country of origin’ (Poynting 
and Mason, 2006: 366). The modern use, as demonstrated in this article, spreads beyond 
ethnicity, citizenship, and migration. A common point between the historical and contem-
porary ‘fifth columns’ is in their position of being expelled from the larger group which 
suspects them of disloyalty. The ‘fifth column’ has, as Loeffel (2015: 9) notes, been ‘ill-
defined as to include and account for a range of activities and purposes … It essentially 
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replaced previous terms such as “traitor” and “spy” and was therefore a modern adapta-
tion of a timeless practice’.
Since it represents expulsion and betrayal, the ‘fifth column’ label is not merely a 
description of its object; instead, it points at a relationship that involves the expelled 
object, the group that expels it, and public discourse that turned this object into a threat. 
The use of the label in political speech or media thus bears significance for the speaker as 
well as the object, and should not be regarded in isolation from the speaker’s collective 
identity. This means that the focus should not solely be on whether the accusation is true 
or not, but on what motivates the larger group to revert to this act of expulsion and 
‘enforce a particular reading of a threat according to which people and groups are defined’ 
(Foucault, 1980: 201; Kinnvall, 2004: 745).
Identity and its security are central to the power of the ‘fifth column’ accusation. Identity 
is understood here as a subjective and imprecise experience of sameness (Campbell, 1998; 
Volkan, 1988). This experience relies on imagining the community as a whole, united 
through valued symbolic traits that represent membership (Anderson, 1983). For example, 
to be accepted as a member of a nation, a person needs ‘to be recognisable as living up to 
the national ideal in the first place’ (Ahmed, 2004: 133). Identities are therefore constantly 
performed and (re)negotiated, including performance through narratives and media repre-
sentations, particularly in times of uncertainty or threat. Shared cultural experiences, his-
torical memories, and symbols are important as ‘different persons must be able to nourish 
their imagination from the same source’ (Boltanski, 1999: 50) and share established refer-
ents. ‘Fifth column’ presents such a recognizable symbol that suggests deviation from 
acceptable norms of belonging (disloyalty) and affirms the boundary of the group against 
an expelled object. The attributes of the ‘enemy within’ can differ as an imprint of various 
cultural and historical contexts (e.g. suspicion of Muslims after 9/11 or mistrust of opposi-
tion after the history of instability in authoritarian states). ‘Fifth column’ language is a 
form of othering that contains ‘effects of histories that have stayed open’ (Ahmed, 2004: 
59) and emphasizes difference in order to build up ‘feelings of we-ness’ (Appadurai, 2006: 
59) – a ‘specific form of life [that] is considered worthy’ (Hudson, 2014: 106).
Communities aim to construct ‘secure’ identities – a sense of ‘home’ (Kinnvall, 2004: 
747), which would rule out uncertainty and avoid questioning the self. To achieve this, in 
times of threat, communities expel outsiders and tend towards more ‘secure’ (and often 
nationalist) identities. In this sense, the discovery of a ‘fifth column’ is a symptom of a 
bigger crisis. Expelling parts of a community as treacherous restores the sense of security 
and empowerment and appeals to the community’s desire to have a continuously positive 
view of themselves (Chernobrov, 2016). For example, the ‘fifth column’ scare in 1940s 
became widely accepted as it offered a comforting explanation for ‘Nazi success, not in 
terms of superior military tactics, but as the result of the work of agents infiltrated as 
aliens’ (Thurlow, 1999: 484).
The ‘fifth column’ label is a symbolic language that contains associated meanings and 
constructs boundaries and identities at the moment of speaking (Ahmed, 2004). Its use in 
media or political speech brings together speakers, topic, and audience into a ‘rhetorical 
performance’ of identity (Atkins and Finlayson, 2016: 174), or ‘rhetorical situations’ 
more broadly (Bitzer, 1999), which are shaped by particular occasion and expectation. I 
argue that a significant number of political references to a ‘fifth column’ were made in 
response to crises, threats or political competition, where the expectation of the audience 
is in the provision of security, understood here as certainty, clear identification of threat-
ening objects, and their expulsion/disempowerment.
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In identifying threatening objects, expelling them and securing the speaker’s identity, 
the ‘fifth column’ label acts as a frame – the ‘central organizing idea’ (Gamson and 
Modigliani, 1989) that promotes ‘a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, 
moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation’ (Entman, 1993: 52). Framing by 
political elites can be particularly powerful in an environment where multiple actors com-
pete to define societal problems (Chong and Druckman, 2007). Public opinion and politi-
cal behaviour are influenced by media (Ladd and Lenz, 2009), including the creation of 
associations between threats (and other negative traits) and particular communities 
(Gilliam and Iyengar, 2000). Even when consciously rejected, media reminders of these 
associations can still inform judgement (Berinsky and Mendelberg, 2005). This makes 
political and media discourse on the construction of threats, identity, and expelled objects 
crucial in understanding societal insecurities and tensions. A ‘fifth column’ accusation in 
politics can then be viewed as part of collective identity securitization which involves 
speakers, media, and audience. It manifests a deeper social and political process than 
simply an accusation of disloyalty, and should be analysed as part of the broader public 
discourse of threats.
Method
This study combines content and discourse analysis of newspaper articles. Although 
quantification of traitor accusations is not my ultimate aim, quantitative content analysis 
helped discover the dominant speakers and objects of the traitor claims and their connec-
tion to particular events. I identify three dominant patterns: authoritarian states describing 
undesired objects; suspicions of western Muslim populations as potential terrorists, and 
use of traitor language to denote political party dissent. These are further explored discur-
sively with the understanding that political and media language helps negotiate societal 
relations (Krippendorf, 2004), including the construction of agency and inequality (Van 
Dijk, 2008).
Data
Materials were collected via LexisNexis database, using the keywords ‘fifth column’ and 
‘fifth columnist(s)’1 to search through major UK and US newspapers2 between 1 January 
2011 and 30 June 2016. The choice of British and American newspapers and the timeline 
achieves two aims. This period started with the Arab Spring events, included the refugee 
crisis, and ended with Brexit vote and Donald Trump winning the Republican Party presi-
dential primaries. The focus of the emergent scholarship on the divisive rhetoric in the 
aftermath of the Brexit vote and Trump’s election, and on the accompanying activization 
of the European and American far right underestimates the presence of threat and traitor 
narratives prior to these campaigns and outside them. This study fills this gap. The period 
of over 5 years also captured more prolonged applications of the label than single speech 
acts. On the other hand, in their wide international coverage, British and American news-
papers reported ‘fifth column’ accusations in over 40 countries between 2011 and 2016, 
enabling me to draw conclusions not only about the two countries’ politics, but also about 
modern ‘traitors’ in various national contexts and their construction in western media.
The keywords occurred in 826 (596 UK/230 US) original articles, but some of these 
mentions were unrelated to the politics of today and invoked the term in historical con-
texts, from Nazi sympathizers to anti-communist work of the US House Committee on 
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Un-American Activities. These mentions help maintain collective identities as ‘narrated 
selves’ through shared cultural memories (Subotić, 2016: 7) and make the ‘fifth column’ 
label recognizable. The total of 609 (427 UK/182 US) articles were analysed, capturing 
all relevant mentions. News stories, editorials, and opinion pieces were included as they 
present media content available to readers and form part of the wider societal discourse in 
which the label in used.
Coding
Coding focused on several elements: speakers invoking the label, objects accused of 
being a ‘fifth column’, temporal dynamics; occurrence in home or international news, and 
the presence or absence of the fifth column’s responding voice in the article.
Speakers were coded in three main categories: politicians of different calibre reported 
as making the ‘fifth column’ claim, journalist/writer invoking the label themselves, and 
other quoted journalists, activists, and academics. Politicians were further coded into sub-
categories that identified particular leaders, their incumbent or oppositional status, and 
whether they come from the right to far-right of the political spectrum.3
Seven main categories were used to code for objects of the accusation: political oppo-
nent/opposition, anti-Muslim to anti-terrorism rhetoric, migrants, local ethnic minorities, 
foreign military or spy, other, or not specified. Anti-Muslim and anti-terrorism rhetoric 
was further subdivided into (a) Muslim population, (b) Islamists/terrorists, and (c) terror-
ists/no religion mentioned. These subcategories allowed a more nuanced insight into the 
claims about western Muslims and their potential connection to terrorism. In particular, 
this allowed me to differentiate the more nationalist arguments about the ‘fifth column’ 
threat of multiculturalism, Muslim neighbourhoods, traditions and Sharia law looming 
over western schools, from the conservative/national security concerns about the threat of 
small Islamist cells rather than British or American Muslim populations in general. There 
was also a less frequent connection between the Muslim/terrorist theme and migration. 
Coding followed the way the threat had been represented in the article.4 Intercoder relia-
bility between two coders on a 10% sample ranged from Cohen’s Kappa 0.80 to 0.95 
(Lombard et al., 2002).
Finally, articles were also coded according to whether the ‘fifth column’ was men-
tioned in UK or US home politics or internationally (other countries using the term). It 
was also noted if the voice of the group or individual who had been called a ‘fifth column’ 
was present in the article. Its absence could suggest the power of the label as symbolic 
prohibition to engage with the ‘other’.
Results
Dynamics and underlying events
Articles containing ‘fifth column’ mentions were spread unevenly over the five-and-a-
half-year period (Table 1).
Analysis of the frequency of ‘fifth column’ mentions in home vs international cover-
age can help connect them to particular events. In 2011, the ‘fifth columns’ predominantly 
occurred in international news. In all, 71% of the British articles and 65% of American 
articles with an international ‘fifth column’ reference in 2011 were reporting the Libyan 
uprising and a variety of rebel statements about the ‘fifth columns’ of ‘Gaddafi 
loyalists’.
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By 2015, the use of ‘fifth column’ language in domestic politics became particularly 
visible in British newspapers as home mentions exceeded international. The home ‘fifth 
column’ suspicions were intensifying in the wake of Charlie Hebdo shootings, Paris 
attacks, the refugee crisis, Brexit and the growing hostility to migrants.
Two major political developments underlie international references to ‘fifth columns’ 
in both British and American newspapers in 2014–2015. Amid growing tensions with the 
West, a number of Russian official statements described political opposition and western 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) as a ‘fifth column’, followed by the assassina-
tion of a prominent opposition figure Boris Nemtsov in February 2015. These statements 
were widely reported in British and American newspapers, amounting to 48% and 58% 
of international ‘fifth column’ mentions in 2015 respectively. This is also the time of the 
Ukrainian crisis, western sanctions, and media speculations of a ‘new cold war’ that built 
up the ‘Russian threat’ and underpinned references to a Russian ‘fifth column’ inside 
Ukraine, the Baltics, the European Union (EU), and the United States.
Speakers and objects
There were two clearly dominant categories of speakers, or initiators of the ‘fifth column’ 
label, in both British and American newspapers (Table 2): politicians reported to be using 
the label (40% and 39%, respectively) and journalists/writers of the articles themselves 
(39.1% and 37.4%). Importantly, this signifies the presence of the ‘fifth column’ label in 
both political speech and societal narratives of exclusion. Among politicians, UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) leader Nigel Farage and Russian president Vladimir Putin 
were the main speakers in the British sample. Statements by Farage were barely noted in 
the US newspapers (only 3.1% among politicians), while Putin’s ‘fifth column’ claims 
were covered more closely than in the British sample. Given that Farage is less known in 
the United States, this is not surprising. In addition, the US media had a stronger focus on 
Russian politics in the wake of the Ukrainian crisis, rather than on the British immigration 
debate. Other politicians using the label were reported less frequently and ranged from 
the US Republican candidate Donald Trump to Israel’s Foreign Minister of the time 
Avigdor Lieberman and Christian Estrosi, the right-wing Mayor of Nice.5
In British newspapers, politicians using the label tended to represent opposition 
(60%) from the right to far-right side of the political spectrum (55.9%). This result 
was largely stimulated by the intensive coverage of particular statements (such as 
Farage’s “fifth column” speech in January 2015) and the wider debate that they 
stirred. In the US newspapers, domestic and international politicians using the label 
Table 1. ‘Fifth column’ in home and international coverage in British and American articles by 
year.
UK articles 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* TOTAL
Total (n) 74 41 34 68 176 34 427
Home/international (n) 21/53 23/18 20/14 29/39 103/73 19/15 215/212
US articles 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016* TOTAL
Total (n) 33 19 11 42 63 14 182
Home/international (n) 10/23 12/7 1/10 8/34 15/48 7/7 53/129
*In all tables data for 2016 only includes articles until 30 June.
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were predominantly in power/office (72.5%) and unlikely to be far-right (only 11.6% 
of politicians). This suggests that the modern ‘fifth column’ label in political speech 
is not exclusively the language of the right or far-right groups as may have been 
expected. Neither is it entirely marginal, as a significant proportion of political speak-
ers were in a position of power.
The wide use of the label by journalists and writers themselves, and by other quoted 
societal actors (other journalists, activists, experts), suggests that the ‘fifth column’ has 
become if not frequent, then a more normalized term across societal layers. As a ‘rhetori-
cal performance’ (Atkins and Finlayson, 2016), it is used by all members of the commu-
nity and not only in political speech.
The main objects, or individuals and groups being called ‘fifth column’ (Table 3), were 
opposition leaders and opposition in general (48.7% and 58.2% in the UK and US news-
papers). This made political struggle the dominant theme where ‘fifth column’ accusa-
tions were reported. The term was applied in home and international coverage in much 
the same way – to suggest externally dictated loyalties (e.g. a ‘fifth column’ of Cruz or 
Table 2. Speakers of the ‘fifth column’ claim.
Speaker type British articles American articles
% of total % within category % of total % within category
Politician 40.0 – 39.0 –
Farage 17.6 43.9 1.6 4.2
Putin 6.1 15.2 10.4 26.8
Other 16.4 40.9 26.9 69.0
In power/office 15.9 40.0 27.5 72.5
Not in power/office 23.9 60.0 10.4 27.5
Right/far right 22.2 55.9 4.4 11.6
Quoted journalist/
activist/academic
20.9 – 23.6 –
Journalist/writer 39.1 – 37.4 –
Table 3. Objects of the ‘fifth column’ claim.
Object type British articles American articles
% of total % within category % of total % within category
Political opponent/opposition 48.7 – 58.2 –
Anti-Muslim to anti-
terrorism rhetoric
26.2 – 16.5 –
Muslim population 18.0 68.8 11.0 66.7
Islamists/terrorists 6.6 25.0 4.9 30.0
terrorists/no religion mentioned 1.6  6.2 0.5 3.3
Migrants 5.6 – 4.9 –
Local ethnic minority 5.2 – 6.6 –
Foreign military or spy 0.7 – 0.5 –
Other 10.5 – 12.6 –
Not specified 3.0 – 0.5 –
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Trump supporters inside the US Republican Party, a UKIP ‘fifth column’ inside the UK 
Conservative party, or Russian opposition manipulated by the West).
Growing anti-Muslim sentiments came second (26.2% and 16.5%, respectively), 
largely in the context of terrorism. Suspicion about British, American, or European 
Muslims as a whole dominated British and American coverage almost equally (68.8% 
and 66.7%). This finding supports and updates the evidence from other studies that after 
9/11 whole Muslim communities have gained ‘unwelcome visibility’ (Tsagarousianou, 
2012) and been criminalized (Poynting and Mason, 2006) in the Anglophone press and 
portrayed alongside, rather than as part of western communities (Croft, 2012). A distinc-
tion between Islamists and whole Muslim populations was made in only a quarter of ter-
rorist ‘fifth column’ mentions, and still fewer articles (6.2% and 3.3%) did not connect 
terrorism to any religion.
The description of migrants as a ‘fifth column’ in most instances also suggested con-
flicted identities which could jeopardize national security (such as being opposed to west-
ern democratic and secular ideals or sympathizing with Paris attackers). All of the migrant 
‘fifth column’ mentions in the UK press and 88.8% of US press mentions took place in 
2014–2016, confidently connecting them to the refugee crisis and the perceived threat of 
terrorism. The connection between anti-migrant sentiments and the fear of Muslims as 
terrorists is not surprising as most incoming refugees in Europe for that period were 
Muslim (Hackett, 2015).
‘Fifth column’ accusations mostly meant the creation of an excluded and silenced 
group. Only 30% of British and 39% of American articles reported the response of those 
accused (for example, statements from the Russian opposition, British Muslims, or party 
defectors). This points at the highly prohibitive nature of the ‘fifth column’ description, 
when by excluding the disloyal object, the speaker prevents potential dialogue with ‘fifth 
columnists’ and rules out engagement with their logic or motivation. ‘A rigid boundary 
explicitly precludes any possibility of engaging the ‘other’’ (Murer, 2009: 117), and 
depicting the ‘fifth column’ in the language of betrayal means that listening to its argu-
ments would mean being unfaithful to the remaining group (a historical parallel to 
Un-American activities comes to mind).
Based on the results above, I was able to identify three main patterns in how, by whom, 
and to whom the ‘fifth column’ label was applied. All three patterns are novel, compared 
to the initial or well-documented political ‘traitors’ and ‘fifth columns’.
Pattern 1. Authoritarian states speaking about political opposition
A large proportion of the international mentions of the ‘fifth column’ emerged from 
reporting how governments and media in authoritarian states portrayed their political 
opposition (Table 4). The labelling of political opponents as ‘fifth columnists’ was most 
frequently reported in Russia, Libya, Egypt, and Turkey.
Political opposition was typically blamed as externally funded, destabilizing, and 
treacherous. It was described as a ‘fifth column of Western-oriented Russians’ and 
‘national traitors working for foreign interests’ (Russia); ‘belligerent’ and ‘paid agents of 
enemy powers’ (Egypt); ‘plotting a revolution’ (Azerbaijan); ‘in the pay of foreign ene-
mies out to destabilise Belarus’ (Belarus); ‘treasonous fifth columnists of foreign powers’ 
(Turkey); or ‘backed by Iran and bent on toppling the Khalifa dynasty’ (Bahrain). These 
claims and their connection to authoritarianism can be understood within the broader 
context of the construction of threats and security. ‘Fifth column’ accusation can act as a 
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Table 4. International references to a ‘fifth column’ by country, with year dynamics and the ‘fifth column’ object.
Country British articles American articles Fifth column
Total N % 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Total N % 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016  
Russia 65 30.7% 2 1 2 21 36 3 51 39.5% – 2 2 17 29 1 Political opposition, western influence
Libya 38 17.9% 38 – – – – – 15 11.6% 15 – – – – – Political opposition; Gaddafi loyalists
USA 13 7.1%  3 1 2 1 6 2 – – American Muslims; Syrian refugees; ISIS sympathizers
Syria 10 4.7% – 4 1 1 4 –  2 1.6% – 1 – 1 – – Turkmen as fifth column for Turkey; ISIS sympathizers
France 10 4.7% – 1 1 – 8 – – – French Muslims; ISIS sympathizers
Israel 10 4.7%  1 2 – 2 4 1 12 9.3%  1 – – 3  7 1 Arabs/Palestinians in Israel
Egypt 7 3.3%  1 2 2 2 – – 11 8.5%  2 1 5 3 – – Political opposition; protesters
Turkey 7 3.3%  1 – – 1 2 3 1 0.8% – – – – – 1 Political opposition; academics; Armenians
Ukraine 6 2.8% – – – 5 1 – 5 3.9% – – –  4 1 – Separatists; pro-Russian population
EU 6 2.8% – – 1 1 4 – – – ISIS sympathizers; Russian influence on EU unity
Belarus 4 1.9%  3 1 – – – – 5 3.9%  4 1 – – – – Political opposition
Iraq 4 1.9% – – 1 1 2 – 1 0.8% – – –  1 – – ISIS; Ba’athists
Greece 3 1.4% – – 1 – 2 – – – pro-German politicians; Russian influence on EU unity
Saudi Arabia 3 1.4% – – – – – 3 – – Shiites
Latvia 3 1.4% – – – 2 – 1 – – Russian influence
Iran 2 0.9%  1 – – 1 – – 1 0.8% – – –  1 – – Political opposition
Australia 2 0.9% – – – 1 1 – 1 0.8% – – –  1 – – Australian Muslims
UK – – 6 4.7% – – – –  4 2 British Muslims; ISIS sympathizers; Labour
Bahrain  1  0.5%  1 – – – – – 3 2.3% 1 1 –  1 – – Political opposition; Shiites
Azerbaijan – – 3 2.3% – – –  1  2 – Political opposition
China – – 2 1.6% – – – –  2 – Political opposition
% is percentage of the total number of international fifth column mentions in the respective sample. Only countries with at least 2 mentions are included. Countries with one mention: Afghanistan, 
Belgium, Canada, CAR, Czech Republic, DRC, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, India, Ireland, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Norway, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, UAE, Venezuela, Yemen, and NATO 
member-states on the whole.
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‘securitizing move’ (Buzan et al., 1998) by agents in power. By portraying the opposition 
as an existential threat to the nation, authorities transform political competition into rheto-
ric of national survival and stability. As the result, they assert their own legitimacy and 
equate national identity with support for the existing institutions of power.
Lexical analysis (Richardson, 2007) reveals that the language in which these accu-
sations were reported in the British and American newspapers was no less prohibitive 
and self-securitizing in its criticism of the authoritarian model. Reporting the accusa-
tion was accompanied by words ‘paranoia’, ‘dangerous’, ‘ridiculous’, ‘unsettled’, 
‘repression’, ‘gambit’, ‘linchpin’, ‘propaganda-brainwashed’, ‘jingoistic vibe’, ‘grim 
tales’, or ‘dictator’s fix’. Parallel to this, the opposition was constructed as a victim 
deserving sympathy of a western reader. This was achieved through words that create 
associations and mobilize emotions by relating to social and cultural practices (Ahmed, 
2004: 46). For example, opposition was widely described as ‘pro-democracy’, ‘pro-
western’, ‘muzzled’, ‘beleaguered’, ‘besieged’, ‘slain’, ‘suppressed’, and ‘suffocated’. 
The persuasive power of these metaphors of physical harm is in their ability to arouse 
feelings of fear and emotional connection to the victim (Charteris-Black, 2011: 15). 
Besides pointing at familiar and repelled symbols of physical violence, these words 
also appealed to the western acceptance of political opposition as a democratic prac-
tice that needs to be protected.
The relationship between the authoritarian governments and opposition was often 
portrayed as amoral, dirty, monstrous, or otherwise repelling. For example, The 
Guardian wrote after Nemtsov’s murder: ‘Muddying the waters, pro-Kremlin figures 
rushed to come up with apparently outlandish theories that the killing was meant to 
frame Putin’ (Walker, 2015). A few years earlier, The Guardian dismissed Putin’s accu-
sations of Russian opposition as a ‘fifth column’ as ‘classic KGB stuff’ (Harding, 2011). 
The Washington Post (2015) spoke of ‘a tired and stale fear of authoritarian bosses, in 
China and elsewhere’, comparing Chinese anti-opposition laws with Putin ‘cracking 
the whip’ ( ‘China’s insatiable appetite for power’). Speaking of Belarus, the American 
newspaper contrasted ‘Europe’s last dictator’ with ‘pro-democracy opponents’ 
(Weymouth, 2011). Placing complex political realities into a familiar democracy-
oppression frame helped securitize a western democratic identity as the positive con-
trast from authoritarian others.
Pattern 2. Fear of Muslims as terrorists
This pattern could be observed in both home and international ‘fifth column’ language. 
While stimulated by particular political speeches (by Farage, Trump, Estrosi and others), 
claims of western Muslims as potential ‘terrorist sympathizers’ were widely debated 
within the broader themes of multiculturalism, security, and immigration.
In the British sample, a polemic between two opinion pieces can offer insights into this 
use of language, while being illustrative of the wider Muslim ‘fifth column’ debate. The 
first, written by Mehdi Hasan (2015), appeared in The Guardian and clearly rejected 
Farage’s ‘fifth column’ accusation as ‘Islamophobic bullying’. British Muslims were 
depicted as ‘spied on, stopped and searched, stripped of citizenship, and subjected to con-
trol’. The other piece (Pearson, 2015), in conservative The Daily Telegraph, supported the 
use of the label and constructed two parallel identities: a progressive British identity 
(‘advantages of growing up in our country’, ‘liberal’, ‘democratic’, ‘education’) and a non-
performing Muslim identity ( ‘hated our way of life’; ‘murdered’; ‘lack of understanding’; 
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‘failure to accept our values’). While representative of other articles in tone and means of 
expression, both pieces appeal to the ‘ever-changing notions of what constitutes the accept-
able attributes of citizenship and belonging’, or ‘gradations’ of acceptance (Skrbis, 2006: 
182). The formal (gaining citizenship) and social levels of acceptance are not the same 
(Hage, 1998: 50); and the ‘fifth column’ label manifests a conflict between these levels. A 
looming threat (either physical or perceived) may lead identities to redraw their ‘accepta-
ble attributes’ of performance or intensify the existing ones. Loyalty to the group is then 
seen in a successful performance of belonging, with ‘disloyal’ members becoming 
expelled. Both articles speak of Islamophobia in the context of terrorism. When faced with 
a threat, a society in need of security escapes into familiar and therefore controllable rela-
tionships, even if they present an unnecessary escalation or exaggeration (Chernobrov, 
2016). This can motivate the ‘fifth column’ claim as a way to expel blame on familiar tar-
gets, those with whom the accusers may have lived side by side for years, but who retained 
familiar and easily identifiable elements of otherness. Pre-existing schema about religion 
or race is frequently ‘activated’ in response to threat (Higgins and Bargh, 1987). This is 
also where previous historical and cultural contexts may be particularly influential in shap-
ing traitor narratives.
‘Fifth column’ accusations also create a particular form of agency and power rela-
tions. Both articles speak of overpowering actions ( ‘stop’, ‘subject to detention’, ‘mur-
der’) that deprive the victim of its agency. Denigration of the other as traitor or the 
counter-accusation of ‘Islamophobic bullying’ restore agency as they denote the power 
to judge, grant or withdraw acceptance to one’s group. Progressive British identity in 
The Daily Telegraph article assumes recognition as the model self to be imitated by 
aspiring others. The use of the ‘fifth column’ label can then be seen as self-securitization 
of the speaker’s identity, both through expelling blame on familiar targets, and through 
the restoration of the speaker’s agency.
In the United States, the traitor/treason accusations have been particularly visible in 
the 2016 presidential election campaign, and included, but also spread beyond anti-Mus-
lim sentiments. Donald Trump repeatedly questioned the loyalties of American Muslims 
and called Muslim immigrants a threat to national security: for example, with his sugges-
tions of a ‘Muslim fifth column in the United States’ in response to the Orlando mass 
murder (Mahler and Flegenheimer, 2016), and with the travel ban once assuming office. 
During his campaign, Trump also accused President Obama of having ‘a soft spot for 
jihadis … if he doesn’t use the words radical Islam … With a broad brush, [Trump] 
painted American Muslims as a fifth column who knew about jihadi attacks but kept the 
information secret’ (Rubin, 2016). Yet unlike Nigel Farage in the United Kingdom, Trump 
was rarely directly quoted using the ‘fifth column’ or ‘traitor’ language during his cam-
paign. As The Washington Post noted, ‘this isn’t what Trump is saying – because he’s not 
saying what he’s saying’ (Bump, 2016). For example, when accusing Obama of avoiding 
the words ‘Islamic terrorism’,6 Trump suggested that the President ‘doesn’t get it or he 
gets it better than anybody understands’, ‘doesn’t want to know about it’, and further 
tweeted about Obama’s possible ‘support’ for Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Bump, 
2016), thus creating ambiguity which invited treason/fifth column interpretations. This 
explains why Trump has not been more visible among politicians invoking the ‘fifth col-
umn’ label, although the build-up of the treason theme has recently marked American 
politics. Other US politicians also used the label, for example, Louisiana Governor Bobby 
Jindal spoke about ‘a Muslim fifth column, intent on establishing sharia law … and con-
quering the country’ (Gerson, 2015). However, at least in newspaper coverage, the use of 
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the term in political speech has been more widespread in Britain than in the United States 
in recent years.
Pattern 3. Inside parties: Metaphor for party dissent
‘Fifth column’ was widely used in home politics as a metaphor to describe dissent within 
political parties and infiltration of undesired or treacherous opponents into political insti-
tutions. In the United States, ‘traitors’ were reported on several occasions inside the 
Republican Party. The Republican presidential hopeful Ted Cruz was accused of smug-
gling his supporters into Trump delegate seats, while top Republicans who had endorsed 
Trump were accused of being ‘traitors’ and ‘sellouts’. At the opposite end of the political 
spectrum, several articles applied the label to the American ‘Left’, particularly claiming 
their infiltration in American journalism.
However, it was in the British newspapers where this pattern was particularly visible. 
This was largely stimulated by several events even prior to Brexit: the general elections in 
2015, a number of high-ranking ‘defections’ (such as Mark Reckless MP leaving the 
Conservative Party to join UKIP), Labour leadership elections in 2015, and divisions 
about the 2014 Scottish independence referendum. Interestingly, traitor accusations were 
not limited to one political camp: all main parties were reported to have unfaithful mem-
bers. There were a ‘Farage’s fifth column’ and ‘Tory Euro-rebels’ inside the Conservative 
Party; a ‘Tory fifth column’ inside UKIP; Blairite, Tory, and hard left ‘fifth columns’ inside 
Labour; a ‘fifth column’ of Liberal Democrats in the Coalition government, and other 
similar statements. In addition, the Left/Labour as a whole were accused of having insiders 
within political bodies, charities, and media, while the Scottish National Party (SNP) was 
mentioned twice as a ‘fifth column undermining the stability of the nation’. The label was 
also reported in connection to Brexit (Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn was accused of half-
hearted support for Remain), 2016 London mayoral elections (a ‘Khan-Corbynite fifth 
column’ taking over London7), and Labour takeover by the ‘hard left’ and a surge of new 
members after Corbyn’s election as party leader in 2015. Altogether, these ‘fifth columns’ 
accounted for 29.3% of the home application of the label in British newspapers.
The accompanying language was again highly prohibitive, although different from the 
reports of authoritarian governments and their silencing of political opponents. Instead of 
metaphors of physical violence, newspapers tended towards the language of impurity and 
dishonesty: ‘despicable assault’, ‘disloyal’, ‘danced on the grave’, ‘saboteur’, ‘sinister’, 
‘selfish’, ‘shameless’, ‘obsessive’, ‘brilliant at manipulating’, ‘dreadful’. For example, 
The Telegraph spoke of disloyal ‘Blairite zombies’ (Hodges, 2013) inside Labour; while 
Daily Mail wrote about the Left: ‘These people are everywhere … the stealthy acquisition 
of power by the Left in areas previously unpolluted by party politics’ (Letts, 2013). Unlike 
previous patterns where traitor narratives were connected to historical experiences of 
instability or terrorism, here the disloyal political other was constructed through culturally 
symbolic language of socially and morally unacceptable behaviour. This wide application 
of the ‘fifth column’ label in domestic politics demonstrates that it has developed into an 
overarching metaphor to describe complex party infighting across the political spectrum.
Conclusion
Traitor and ‘fifth column’ language may at first glance seem to be the forgotten language 
of leaders and political realities long gone. This study has demonstrated that it is still a 
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powerful symbol with a clear interpretation and a vast variety of objects to which it is 
applied today. The modern ‘traitors’ are mainly found in internal politics (opposition in 
authoritarian states or party dissent in western democracies) and in attitudes to minorities 
(fear of Muslims as terrorists).
While most international ‘fifth column’ mentions in British and American newspapers 
were generally associated with authoritarianism and oppression, the presence of traitor lan-
guage in western democracies should not be underestimated. Importantly, the ‘enemies 
within’ had been increasingly present in British and American political rhetoric before 
Brexit and the election of Donald Trump, and not only in the aftermath of the two cam-
paigns. Neither is ‘fifth column’ framing only employed by the right/far-right populist 
movements, although there is close association of the ‘enemy within’ with racism, xenopho-
bia, and fear of immigration and terrorism. The normalization of traitor language through its 
use by all parties in and out of government suggests unresolved popular concerns and a shift 
of the political spectrum in some western democracies towards the ‘us’ versus ‘them’ per-
spectives, previously largely attributed to authoritarian or populist politics.
Traitor narratives securitize the key political and societal issues (such as immigration, 
the handling of the refugee crisis, political divisions, and counter-terrorism measures) 
where the existing policies seem ineffective or cause public mistrust. In this regard, the 
emergence of collective identity markers which contrast the majority against disloyal 
members (‘fifth columns’) suggests that these issues are no longer framed as merely 
political (requiring a governmental response), but as a matter of security that the existing 
policies and mechanisms fail to provide. This transformation, as Buzan et al. (1998: 24) 
suggest, reframes the issue as an existential threat to a community, identity or group, and 
justifies ‘actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure’.
A major consequence of this is that the political framing of ‘traitors’ and ‘fifth col-
umns’ creates silenced and excluded groups in democratic, as well as authoritarian states. 
Accusing religious, ethnic, migrant, political and other groups of betrayal establishes 
symbolic power, which facilitates and justifies the redrawing of in- and out-group bound-
aries and affirms the legitimacy of certain political actors and policies. And although 
authoritarian and democratic states generally accused different objects of being ‘fifth 
columns’, ‘traitor’ narratives were employed similarly, as a form of securitization, in both 
political systems.
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Notes
1. ‘Fifth column’ is largely synonymous to traitor, treason, betrayal. It was chosen for two reasons: (a) it has 
a narrower interpretation than the others, making its mentions comparable among themselves and (b) the 
proportion of irrelevant mentions for the other terms in the search results was considerably higher as they 
are used more commonly in topics outside politics, while ‘fifth column’ is still representative of the wider 
traitor/treason accusations.
2. These included 10 national British newspapers and their Sunday editions (Daily Mail/The Mail on Sunday, 
The Sun/The Sun on Sunday, The Guardian/The Observer, The Telegraph/The Sunday Telegraph, Daily 
Mirror/Sunday Mirror, The Times/The Sunday Times, Metro, The Independent, Daily Express/Sunday 
Express, Daily Star) and 13 major US newspapers (USA Today, The New York Times, Los Angeles Times, 
New York Post, The Washington Post, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune, Newsday, Orange County 
Register, San Jose Mercury News, Tampa Bay Times, The Philadelphia Inquirer, The Boston Globe). These 
newspapers are in the top 10 and top 25 by readership in the United Kingdom and United States, respec-
tively (see National Readership Survey, n.d. and Alliance for Audited Media, 2013). In the UK sample, 
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81% of the ‘fifth column’ language occurred in broadsheet newspapers (compared to 19% in tabloid), 
as they devote greater attention to political and international news. This study focuses on the political 
applications of the label in national discourse and does not draw conclusions on the trends of individual 
newspapers.
3. This subcategory was informed by the expectation that ‘fifth column’ accusations tend to be the language 
of the far right, nationalist movements. Certain difference between the United Kingdom and United States 
far right and their access to power should be acknowledged (see Feldman, 2015), for example, the politi-
cal presence and parliamentary representation of UK Independence Party (UKIP). Despite variation, far 
right movements typically engage in nationalism, aggressive populism, and prejudice against scapegoated 
minorities (Wodak, 2015).
4. For example, after Charlie Hebdo shooting in January 2015, UKIP leader Nigel Farage said:
‘What happened in Paris is a result–and we’ve seen it in London too–is a result I’m afraid of now hav-
ing a fifth column living within these countries. We’ve got people living in these countries, holding our 
passports, that hate us’. (Channel 4, 2015)
Without a clearly identified object, Farage’s comment was reported differently: as a call for ‘tighter immi-
gration controls’ (Daily Mail), a warning of a ‘fifth column of terrorists’ with no mention of religion or 
migration (Daily Mirror), and as a ‘claim that we have a ‘Muslim problem’’ (The Telegraph). The objects 
of the accusation were coded respectively as migrants, terrorists/no religion mentioned, and Muslim popu-
lation, following interpretations given to audiences.
5. Lieberman accused Arab citizens in Israel of being ‘fifth columnists’ who could facilitate actions of the 
Islamic State. Estrosi complained of an ‘Islamist fifth column’ in France. Trump’s statements are pre-
sented later in the article.
6. This was not Trump’s only attack on Obama where treason, ‘fifth column’, or disloyalty were suggested. 
Prior to that, the ‘birther’ movement, which also involved Trump, called upon Obama to produce his birth 
certificate – implying that he was at best a non-American, and at worst a traitor.
7. Sadiq Khan, member of the Labour Party, won 2016 London mayoral election and succeeded Conservative 
mayor Boris Johnson. Media widely reported Khan as the first Muslim mayor of a western capital.
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